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ASYMMETRIC PAYOFFS IN SIMULTANEOUS AND SEQUENTIAL  
PRISONER’S DILEMMA GAMES 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We investigate the role of payoff asymmetry in laboratory prisoner’s dilemma games. Symmetric 
and Asymmetric games are examined in simultaneous and sequential settings. In the 
asymmetric/sequential games, we study the impact of having payoff advantaged players moving 
either first or second. Asymmetry reduces the rates of cooperation in simultaneous games. In 
sequential games, asymmetry interacts with order of play such that the rate of cooperation is highest 
when payoff disadvantaged players move first. The presence of an exit option increases cooperation 
by the players who choose to play the game when payoffs are symmetric, or when payoffs are 
asymmetric and the payoff disadvantaged player moves first.  
KEY WORDS • cooperation • prisoner’s dilemma • heterogeneity • exit option 
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1. Introduction 
In one-shot prisoner’s dilemma games, the predicted outcome is mutual defection if one 
assumes that players are only concerned about maximizing their own payoffs. This is true 
whether the game is played simultaneously or sequentially. Contrary to this prediction, 
experimental studies of one-shot prisoner’s dilemma settings generally report a significant 
proportion of cooperative choices. Several factors have been identified as increasing or 
decreasing cooperation in one-shot prisoner’s dilemma. Examples include: playing the game 
sequentially results in a higher rate of cooperation than playing the game simultaneously (Ahn, 
Ostrom, and Walker, 2003; Cho and Choi, 2000; Hayashi et al.1999; Clark and Sefton, 2001); the 
larger the payoffs from mutual cooperation compared to those from mutual defection, the higher 
the rates of cooperation (Ahn et al., 2001); the identity of the other player affects a player’s 
likelihood of cooperating (Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Kollock, 1998); pre-play communication 
raises the rates of cooperation (Andreoni and Varian, 1999); when there is an exit option, the 
players who choose not to exit tend to cooperate at a higher rate than that in the game without an 
exit option (Orbell and Dawes, 1993). 
The research reported in this paper focuses on whether or not payoff asymmetry affects 
individual choices in the prisoner’s dilemma game, and how choices are related to whether the 
decision maker is payoff advantaged or disadvantaged. The research is motivated by the fact that, 
in the naturally occurring world of social dilemma situations, the gains from mutual cooperation 
are often times not equally distributed. That is, even when both individuals gain by cooperating 
with each other compared to the case in which both defect, one might gain more than the other.  
Field researchers have often concluded that heterogeneity is a cause of management failure, or 
alternatively, ignore within community asymmetries when there are successes (Agrawal and 
Gibson, 1999). More recently, some have cautioned against making broad claims about the 
putative negative role of heterogeneity (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Lam, 1998; Ruttan and 
Borgerhoff Mulder, 1999; Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson, 2001, 2002; Ostrom, 1990, 2001; 
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Varughese and Ostrom, 2001). For that matter, researchers within the international relations 
tradition have typically emphasized the beneficial effects of heterogeneity among states (Snidel, 
1995), and those studying adaptive resource management institutions stress the positive role of 
actors with heterogeneous motives. Thus, the field research provides mixed views on the role of 
payoff asymmetry and at least one of the reasons for this inconclusiveness seems to be the 
difficulties involved in identifying the payoff structures precisely, even when it is rather clear that 
the situation under investigation constitute a social dilemma. 
Several laboratory social dilemma experiments contribute to a better understanding of the 
roles of asymmetry by precisely defining the incentive structure. For example, Budescu, Rapoport 
and Sulieman (1990) report no difference in mean levels of requests to withdraw units in an 
asymmetrical, 5-person, one-shot, resource dilemma game, as compared to a symmetrical version of 
the game. However, other research reports heterogeneity to be associated with either diminished 
payoff efficiencies, or with increasing difficulty in agreeing to resource sharing rules. Hackett, 
Schlager and Walker (1994) found that in N-person commons dilemmas, heterogeneity in 
endowments reduced earnings relative to the symmetric setting. Furthermore, heterogeneity was 
associated with a reduced ability of group members to agree on allocation rules.  
In this literature, two principal reasons are often discussed for how asymmetry may impact 
levels of cooperation and the form of cooperative agreements. First, asymmetric incentives for 
finding a cooperative agreement may alter subjects’ perceptions of the likelihood of others’ 
willingness to cooperate and thus impact their choices in anticipation of their partner 
cooperating/not cooperating. Second, subjects may have preferences for fair outcomes, reflecting 
more equal payoffs. Van Dijk and Wilke (1995) present evidence that subjects in asymmetrical 
settings are attending to fairness insofar as they arrive at resource sharing rules that vary with 
experimental design. Similarly, in an asymmetric resource dilemma game, Budescu, Rapoport and 
Suleiman (1990), report that a substantial number of subjects make decisions consistent with a 
preference for equity, or proportionality, in earnings.  
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This paper revisits the issue of asymmetry in the most basic social dilemma situation of a 
one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game. To make the comparison more valid between symmetric and 
asymmetric prisoner’s dilemmas, we control for the sum of the two players’ payoffs for each of the 
four outcomes of the game between the games structures. In asymmetric games one player is 
“advantaged’’ and the other “disadvantaged.” The advantaged player not only receives a larger 
payoff in the mutual cooperation outcome than the disadvantaged player, he or she also gains more 
when defecting on a cooperating partner, and loses less when cooperating with a partner that 
defects.  
Given the results from studies in other social dilemmas settings, we expect to observe lower 
rates of cooperation in asymmetric simultaneous games than in symmetric games, due to the innate 
violation of the equity norm.  For sequential games, however, behavior may vary depending on 
whether the disadvantaged player moves first or second. One might argue that since the 
disadvantaged player has more to lose from cooperating with a partner that defects, he or she would 
be more reluctant as a first mover to trust the second mover. On the other hand, one might argue 
that an advantaged player is more likely to reciprocate cooperation by a disadvantaged first mover. 
If this is anticipated by the disadvantaged first mover, cooperation rates may increase for both 
players. A simple formal game theoretical analysis with two types of players (egoists and 
conditional cooperators) and incomplete information supports the latter conjecture as do our 
experimental results. Thus it is shown that institutional rules as rudimentary as the sequence of play, 
can impact rates of cooperation in asymmetric settings. 
While our main focus is the role of asymmetry in the simultaneous and sequential 
prisoner’s dilemma, we also examine how the existence of an exit option might interact with payoff 
asymmetry. Due to the generally high levels of exit choices, we are not able to draw strong 
conclusions regarding the rates of cooperation among those who choose to play the game. However, 
there is some evidence that the probability of choosing to play the game is related to the players’ 
expectation about how the game would be played if they chose to play the game. Thus, for example, 
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the disadvantaged first movers are much more likely to choose to play the game than the 
advantaged first movers.  
In Section 2, we report the symmetric and asymmetric prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrices 
that we use in the experiment and discuss the extent to which precise predictions regarding the 
relative rates of cooperation between symmetric and asymmetric games can be derived from a 
model that assumes two preferences types of egoists and conditional cooperators. In Section 3, the 
details of our experimental design and procedure are explained. In Section 4, we present the results 
of our experiment. In Section 5, we summarize the findings and discuss their implications.  
 
2. A Behavioral Model and Conjectures 
 
2.1 Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoner’s Dilemma Derived from a Public Good Game  
We begin with a discussion of the three payoff matrices utilized in game settings in our 
experiments. The three games, Symmetric, Asymmetric 1, and Asymmetric 2 are shown in Figure 
1 using payoffs in dollars.1 The games were presented to the subjects as shown, with no 
discussion of the “logic” behind the payoffs associated with each outcome. However, the payoff 
matrices were in fact developed to reflect an underlying structure similar to linear public goods 
settings (e.g. Isaac, Walker, and Williams, 1994).  
We imagine each player has an initial endowment of 18 units of a productive resource that 
can be held (option B) or contributed to a group good (option A). In all games, the value of 
holding the endowment is $18. If a participant contributes the resource to the group good, he/she 
incurs a loss of his/her endowment and an additional loss of $6, for a total loss of $24. However, 
each contribution to the group good yields a payoff benefit to both players. 
 
[ Figure 1 about here] 
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In the symmetric game, the marginal benefit to each player of a contribution to the group 
good is $18. Consider the case where player i contributes and player j does not contribute. Player 
i receives a payoff of $12 (the $18 marginal benefit, plus the $18 endowment, minus the $24 cost 
of contributing). Player j receives a payoff of $36 (the $18 marginal benefit plus the $18 
endowment). If both players contribute, they both receive $30 (the $18 marginal benefit from 
each contribution, plus the $18 endowment, minus the $24 cost of contributing).  
In the asymmetric games, the size of the marginal benefit from the group good varies 
between players. The high marginal benefit player, the “advantaged” player, receives a marginal 
benefit of $20 for each contribution to the group good, while the low marginal benefit player, the 
“disadvantaged” player, receives a marginal benefit of $16 for each contribution to the group 
good.  The two asymmetric games differ in whether player 1 or 2 is the advantaged or 
disadvantaged player. All other aspects of the payoffs are calculated as in the symmetric game. 
Note that across all three games, the sum of payoffs to the two participants is constant for the 
outcomes associated with A, B and B, A. In addition, the summed payoff for any particular cell is 
constant across game designs. For brevity, in the discussions that follow, we will refer to an 
action of contributing to the group good as cooperation (C) and an action of not contributing to 
the group good as defection (D). 
2.2 A Model of Heterogeneous Preferences in Prisoner’s Dilemma 
We first derive conjectures regarding the effects of payoff asymmetry based on a 
simplified version of heterogeneous preferences. The model adds a single “guilt” parameter to the 
monetary payoffs. In recent years there have been a growing number of studies examining the 
theoretical implications of fairness considerations (Rabin, 1993; Binmore, 1998), as well as 
experimental demonstrations of its importance in both humans (Ochs and Roth, 1989; Andreoni, 
Brown and Vesterland, 2002; Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003) and non-human 
primates (Brosnan and DeWaal, 2003). It is reasonable, based on this literature, to assume that 
many subjects act in a manner that is consistent with decisions based on reciprocal expectations 
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or expectations of trust (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995, Croson, 1998). Several formal 
models of social preferences (for example, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; 
Cox and Friedman 2002) attempt to represent the inter-individual heterogeneity in preferences in 
precise manners. Our model is consistent with all of these models when applied to the prisoner’s 
dilemma game in that it allows for two major preference types: egoists and conditional 
cooperators. Egoists have strictly self-interested preferences; conditional cooperators prefer to 
cooperate if the other player also cooperates.  
Formally, suppose players experience guilt when defecting on a cooperating counterpart.  
Let Ti,Ri,Pi, and Si (Ti > Ri > Pi > Si ) stand for the four objective payoffs for player i of the 
prisoner’s dilemma game as conventionally identified.2 Let gi (0 ≤ gi ≤ Ti - Pi ) denote the magnitude 
of guilt (loss of utility) a player incurs when the outcome is (D,C) where D stands for defection and 
C for cooperation. If gi is greater than Ti - Ri, a player prefers the outcome (C,C) to the outcome 
(D,C) and, thus, is a conditional cooperator as we define the term. Otherwise, the player is an egoist. 
Egoists have a preference ordering of  u(D,C)>u(C,C)> u(D,D)> u(C,D) and the conditional 
cooperator’s preference ordering is either u(C,C)> u(D,C)> u(D,D)> u(C,D) or u(C,C)> u(D,D)> 
u(D,C)> u(C,D)). 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
In our symmetric game, T1 = T2 =36, R1 = R2 =30, P1 = P2 =18, and S1 = S2 = 12. In our 
asymmetric games Ti = 38, Ri  = 34, Pi = 18,  Si =14 for the advantaged player, and Ti = 34, Ri  = 26, 
Pi = 18,  Si =10 for the disadvantaged player. Note that the payoff parameters (Ti,Ri,Pi, and Si) and a 
player’s intrinsic motivation (gi) jointly determines the player’s preferences over possible outcomes 
of  a given prisoner’s dilemma game. At the population level, the proportion of conditional 
cooperators in a population is jointly determined by the payoff parameters of a prisoner’s dilemma 
game and the distribution of gi in the population. The existence and proportion of conditional 
 Ahn, Lee, Ruttan, and Walker 9
cooperators alters the equilibrium prediction of the game as it changes the nature of the decision 
making problem for players of both types.  
2.3 Theoretical Analysis  
What are the implications of these modeling assumptions, based on a simplified version of 
the widely shared views on preferences among behavioral game theorists and experimentalists? We 
find that our model, as well as all of the aforementioned formal models of heterogeneous 
preferences, provides clear prediction, in terms of the relative rates of cooperation among 
symmetric and asymmetric prisoner’s dilemmas, only among the second movers of the sequential 
game. Among the players in simultaneous games and among the first movers of the sequential 
game, the prediction is indeterminate unless one assumes certain distributions of the preference 
parameter(s).  
Sequential Second Movers 
As mentioned before, sequential play of a prisoner’s dilemma generally results in a higher 
rate of cooperation as compared to simultaneous play. Ahn, Ostrom, and Walker (2003) show that 
this pattern is consistent with predictions based on formal models of other-regarding preferences 
such as inequity aversion. The logic of this prediction follows from the notion that some players 
prefer to cooperate in order to achieve the outcome that maximizes joint payoffs. Yet, they may 
require sufficient assurance that their partner will also cooperate. A sequential game provides a 
mechanism for first movers to signal their willingness to trust their partner by cooperating, thus 
eliminating the uncertainty about the first players’ intentions. However, if first movers have reasons 
for believing their partner will not reciprocate with cooperation, levels of cooperation will be 
reduced. Asymmetry in payoffs introduces such a reason. If participants consider payoff 
asymmetries in evaluating whether their partner is likely to reciprocate cooperation, we would 
expect order of play by payoff advantaged or disadvantaged players to be important. 
The clearest prediction is obtained regarding the relative likelihood of cooperation among 
the second movers responding to first mover’s cooperation.  
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Proposition 1. Among second movers responding to first movers' cooperation, the rate of 
cooperation is highest in Asymmetric 2 (in which the disadvantaged player moves first) followed 
by Symmetric, and lowest in Asymmetric 1 (in which the advantaged player moves first). 
For a second mover in the Symmetric game responding to first mover’s cooperation, u(D) 
= 36- gi and u(C|C) = 30. Therefore, gi must be at least 6 for this player to cooperate. Let g* 
denote the critical gi that separates egoists and reciprocators for a given payoff structure; g*= 6 in 
the Symmetric game. Similar calculations show that for Asymmetric 1, g*= 8, and for 
Asymmetric 2, g*= 4. Thus, given that the first mover cooperates, the second mover in 
Asymmetric 2 has the highest probability of reciprocating. This is also consistent with the 
temptation parameter argument of Rappoport and Chamma (1965) and the behavioral results of 
Ahn et al. (2001). Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) somewhat more complicated inequity aversion 
model with two parameters yields the same predictions. In fact, the predicted behavior for second 
movers is equivalent for most of the behavioral models.3  
There is an intuitive explanation for these predictions. Previous studies have shown that the 
quantities such as greed (Ti - Ri) and cooperators’ gain (Ri - Pi) are strong predictors of behavior in 
one-shot prisoner’s dilemma games (Ahn et al. 2001). In an asymmetrical payoff structure, the two 
players face players with levels of greed and/or cooperator’s gain that are different from their own. 
Thus, depending on relative payoffs, one of the players is more (or less) likely to reciprocate 
cooperation. The prediction regarding the rates of cooperation among the second movers 
responding to first mover’s cooperation reflects the fact that, in the games we examine, greed is the 
smallest for payoff advantaged players ($4), followed by that for players in the symmetric games 
($6), and the largest for the disadvantaged players ($8). On the other hand, cooperators’ gain, 
which has shown to be positively related with rates of cooperation, is the largest for the advantaged 
players ($16), followed by that for players in the symmetric game ($12), and the lowest for the 
disadvantaged players ($8). Thus, disadvantaged players have greater incentives to defect than do 
advantaged players. 
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Sequential First Movers 
While the predictions are clear with regard to the relative likelihood of cooperative choices 
among the second movers of the sequential game, this is not the case with regard to the first movers 
of the sequential game. More specifically, without particular assumptions about the actual 
distribution of player types, the predicted behavior for the first mover is indeterminate.  
Following the notation given above, let, Prob(g ≥ 6) =1-F(6) = ps, Prob(g ≥ 8) = 1-F(8) = 
p1, and Prob(g ≥ 4) = 1-F(4) = p2, where F(·) is the cumulative distribution function of gi. Then, ps, 
p1, and p2 are the probabilities that a second mover will cooperate responding to a first mover’s 
cooperation in Symmetric, Asymmetric 1, and Asymmetric 2, respectively. From the analyses 
above (Proposition 1) we know that p2 > ps > p1. Let rs, r1, and r2 denote the probabilities that a first 
mover of the sequential game will cooperate in Symmetric, Asymmetric 1, and Asymmetric 2, 
respectively. 
Proposition 2. p2 > ps > p1 does not imply r2 > rs > r1. That is, the probabilities of cooperation 
among first movers in sequential games are not dictated by the ordering of probabilities of 
cooperation among second movers. 
A first mover's expected utility calculation for the Symmetric game can be calculated as 
follows: u(C) = ps * 30 + (1- ps ) * 12 = 18ps + 12, and u(D) = 18. Thus, a first mover is expected 
to cooperates if ps ≥ 1/3. Similar calculations show that a first mover in Asymmetric 1 cooperates 
if p1 ≥ 1/5 and a first mover in Asymmetric 2 cooperates if p2 ≥ 1/2. This implies that assuming p2 
> ps > p1 is not sufficient to yield predictions as to which of the three games will have the highest 
probability of cooperation by the first mover. This prediction depends on the exact distribution of 
types. For example, suppose for a given F(g), players actual probabilities were p2 = 4/7, ps = 2/7, 
and p1 = 1/7. Then the first mover cooperates only in the Asymmetric game 2 (in which the 
second mover is the advantaged player). But if we assumed p2 = 5/11, ps = 4/11, and p1 = 3/11, the 
first movers cooperate in Symmetric and Asymmetric 1, but not in Asymmetric 2. 
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Simultaneous Games 
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game, again, does not provide a definite 
result regarding the relative frequency of cooperation between the symmetric and asymmetric 
games. This is shown below by focusing on the equilibrium conditions. 
In the symmetric game, suppose there is a cut point on the guilt parameter g* ≥ 6 such that 
all types with g ≥ g* cooperate and all other types defect. Let p* denote the proportion of types that 
cooperate. Then p* = 1- F(g*). The player type g* should be indifferent between cooperating and 
defecting. Thus, 
18*)1(*)36(*)|(
12*)1(30**)|(
×−+−×=
×−+×=
pgpgdu
ppgcu
  
The cut points, when they exist, can be obtained by solving the equality u(c|g*) = u(d|g*) , which 
gives g*=6/(1-F(g*)). This means that the g* that satisfies the expression g* = 6/(1-F(g*)) is the 
cut point of types that cooperate and defect. For a given cumulative distribution F(g), it is possible 
to calculate the proportion of cooperators as p*=1-F(g*).  
In the asymmetric game, again assuming that both the advantaged and disadvantaged 
players are drawn from a common distribution F(g), denote the cut point for the advantaged players 
ga and that for the disadvantaged players gd . Also, let pa =1-F(ga ) and pd =1-F(gd ). Calculating the 
cut points (ga , gd ) involves solving a simultaneous system of equations 
)|()|(
)|()|(
dd
aa
gdugcu
gdugcu
=
=
,  
which simplifies to another simultaneous equation system  
))(1/(8
))(1/(4
ad
da
gFg
gFg
−=
−=
. 
The two cut points can be solved once the distribution F(g) is specified. The proportions of 
cooperating types among advantaged and disadvantaged can be calculated thereafter. (If any of the 
cut points are below 6, or above the upper bound of the distribution, then the distribution does not 
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support an equilibrium in which at least some types cooperate.) The only definite result is that the 
advantaged player is more likely to cooperate than the disadvantaged player, as long as there exists 
at least one equilibrium in which some types cooperate – this is independent of the distribution of 
types. But the analysis does not provide a definite result regarding whether the players in the 
simultaneous game are more likely to cooperate than those in the asymmetrical game. Unlike the 
case of the second movers in a sequential game, the ranking in the simultaneous game depends on 
the exact specification of the distribution of the types.  Thus, we must leave this and the behavior of 
first movers in sequential games as open empirical questions of our study. 
 
3. The Experimental Design and Procedure 
3.1 Procedures 
We report observations from experiments conducted at Indiana University-Bloomington, 
U.S., and Sung Kyun Kwan University, Seoul, Korea.  Participants from Indiana University were 
recruited from introductory economics classes. Participants from Sung Kyun Kwan University 
were recruited from introductory social science classes.4 Instructions used in the experiments 
conducted in Korea were based on a translation of the U.S. experiments. One of the authors 
participated as an experimenter in all sessions in both the U.S. and Korea, insuring that the same 
experimental protocols were utilized across sessions.  
Subjects were recruited in groups of approximately 20 students for each session. Upon 
entering the classroom used to conduct the experiments, subjects were seated in a manner that 
allowed for private decision-making. They were anonymously assigned to a two-person group 
and randomly selected to be “Participant 1” or “Participant 2.” Participants could not identify the 
other participant with whom they were matched or which of the other participants were assigned 
the roles of Participant 1 or Participant 2.  
Three game designs were used: Symmetric, Asymmetric 1, and Asymmetric 2. While 
only one design was utilized in each experimental session, subjects faced four decision situations 
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within each session. Participants were presented with instructions that summarized the 
experimental procedures and were given a detailed description of each of the four decision 
situations. Instructions were read by each participant in private and reviewed publicly by the 
experimenter using an overhead projector. Upon reviewing the instructions for a situation, 
participants were asked to make their decision for that situation. After all four situations had been 
presented, participants were given an opportunity to review all their decisions and make any 
changes they desired.5 
As was explained in the instructions to participants, after decisions were collected the 
experimenters randomly chose one of the four decision situations for determining experimental 
earnings. The choice was made by blindly choosing one of four color-coded chips from a cup. 
Participants’ earnings for the experiment were then calculated based on the game situation 
chosen. Each participant also received a participation fee, which was $5 in U.S. and W5,000 in 
Korea, and completed a questionnaire before leaving the experiment.6  
The four decision situations were presented to the participants as: the first decision 
situation, the second decision situation, the third decision situation, and the fourth decision 
situation. As was the case in the instructions, the descriptions presented below are from the 
perspective of a particular decision situation being randomly chosen to be the one on which 
experimental earnings would be based.  
3.2 The Decision Settings 
The four decision settings that each subject faced are the following. In the first decision 
setting participants made decisions simultaneously. Each participant chose “A” or “B”. In the 
second decision setting, Participant 1 chose “A” or “B”, while Participant 2 made two choices. 
Without knowing the choice of Participant 1, Participant 2 made one choice of “A” or “B” under 
the condition that Participant 1 chose “A.” Participant 2 made another choice of “A” or “B” under 
the condition that Participant 1 chose “B.” Participant 2 made one choice of “A” or “B” under the 
condition that Participant 1 chose “A”, and another choice of “A” or “B” under the condition that 
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Participant 1 chose “B”. In neither case, did participant 2 know the choice of participant 1 before 
making their decision.  The third decision setting parallels the first decision setting, except that 
each participant was given the choice of playing the game or not (the exit option). If a participant 
chose to play the game, he/she chose option “A” or “B.” If a participant chose not to play the 
game, he/she received a known monetary payoff ($24 for Participants 1 and 2 in the Symmetric 
game, $26 for Participant 1 and $22 for Participant 2 in Asymmetric 1, and $22 for Participant 1 
and $26 for Participant 2 in Asymmetric 2.) Note that if either participant chose not to play the 
game in this decision situation, and if this decision situation was randomly chosen at the end of 
the experiment for payoff purposes, then both participants received the payoff associated with not 
playing the game. The fourth decision setting parallels the second decision setting, except that 
each participant is given the choice of playing the game or not. 
 
4. Experimental Results 
Observations are reported on decisions of 80 subjects in the Symmetric game, 48 subjects 
in Asymmetric 1 and 42 subjects in Asymmetric 2. As noted above, for purposes of presentation 
we refer to the choice of “A” as the cooperative choice and “B” as defection. Similarly, with 
respect to the asymmetric games, the participants are referred to as “advantaged” or 
“disadvantaged” and games are described as ones where participant 1 (or 2) has payoff 
advantages or disadvantages. The presentation of results is organized around examining the 
influence of payoff asymmetry in (1) simultaneous decision making with no exit option, (2) 
sequential decision making with no exit option, (3) simultaneous and sequential decision making 
with an exit option. Results are pooled across sessions using the same game design. In addition, 
for the simultaneous setting the observations are pooled across the two asymmetric designs, the 
justification being that subjects make decisions simultaneously and hence there is no logical 
difference between them. For brevity, we do not separately analyze the data of the U.S. and 
Korean subjects. The patterns of results we report are not dependent on such an analysis. 
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Statistics reported are from two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. For tests of statistical 
significance we adopt an α equal to 0.10.  
4.1 Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Simultaneous PD 
Table 1 displays the frequencies of cooperation for both simultaneous and sequential 
settings without an exit option and test statistics for treatment comparisons. In the simultaneous 
setting 32% of subjects cooperate in the Symmetric game, whereas only 13% of subjects 
cooperate in the pooled Asymmetric games. The difference is statistically significant (p = 0.003). 
Of the 12 subjects who cooperate in the latter condition, 8 are advantaged and 4 disadvantaged. 
Comparing decisions made by these two groups with decisions made in the symmetric game, the 
rate of cooperation among players in the Symmetric game is significantly higher in comparison to 
the advantaged players (p = 0.08) and the disadvantaged players (p = 0.003) in the Asymmetric 
games.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Based on prior empirical results and the payoff parameters for greed and cooperators’ 
gain in our game designs, one might expect to observe higher rates of cooperation for advantaged 
players relative to their counterparts in the Symmetric games. However, just like the advantaged 
first movers in the sequential game with asymmetric payoffs, the advantaged player in the 
simultaneous game faces a counterpart whose incentive to cooperate is very low. Thus, if the 
advantaged players take into account the incentives of their counterparts, it is quite possible that 
their rates of cooperation will be lower than those observed for players in the symmetric game.  
Indeed, the results reported in Table 1 confirm this conjecture. This finding suggests that players, 
instead of responding solely to their own payoff structure, take into account the incentives of 
other players with whom they are matched. Therefore, it can be concluded that the results that 
payoff parameters of greed and fear are powerful predictors of the probability of cooperation in 
the symmetric prisoner’s dilemma (Ahn et al., 2001) must be qualified when applied to games in 
which payoffs are asymmetric. 
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4.2 Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Sequential PD  
We next examine the results from games where decisions were made sequentially without 
an exit option. 
Sequential Second Movers: Consistent with the results from other studies, cooperation is very 
low among second movers responding to a first mover’s defection, regardless of the game design. 
The behavior of second movers responding to cooperation is very different. The game theoretic 
model predicts that the rate of cooperation should be highest in Asymmetric 2 (where the 
disadvantaged player is moving first), followed by the Symmetric game, and lowest in 
Asymmetric 1 (where the disadvantaged player is moving second). The ranking we observe is 
consistent with this prediction (43% > 35% > 21%). The differences, however, are not significant; 
in the case of Asymmetric 1 versus Asymmetric 2, p = 0.1154.  
Sequential first Movers: Now, consider the decisions made by first movers. Cooperation rates 
are highest for players in the Symmetric design, followed by first movers in Asymmetric 2 (who 
are disadvantaged), and lowest for first movers in Asymmetric 1 (who are advantaged), 
30%>14%>0%.  The differences in rates of cooperation are not significant between Symmetric 
and Asymmetric 2, but both of these designs yield rates that are significantly different than 
Asymmetric 1. Further, in Asymmetric 1, first movers cooperate at lower rates than players in the 
corresponding simultaneous setting (p = 0.0597). None of the twenty-four advantaged first 
movers cooperated in Asymmetric 1, despite the fact that the fear parameter (P - S) is the smallest 
for these players. Consistent with the behavior of the advantaged players in the simultaneous 
game, the advantaged first movers in the sequential game seem to respond more to their 
expectation of the second movers’ behavior than to their own incentives characterized by the 
parameters fear and greed.  
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4.3 The Exit Choice 
How does asymmetry affect player’s likelihood of choosing to play the game? Table 2 
displays the percentages of players choosing to play for each decision situation, the rates of 
cooperation among this subset of subjects, and test statistics for treatment comparisons. 
[Table 2 about here] 
In the simultaneous setting with an exit option, the likelihood of choosing to play the 
game is not significantly different between symmetric and asymmetric games, but the likelihood 
of cooperation conditional on choosing to play is. As shown, 45% of the subjects choosing to play 
in the Symmetric game also cooperate, whereas in the Asymmetric games only 12% of those 
choosing to play cooperate. The difference is statistically significant at p = 0.005.  
Among the first movers choosing to play in the sequential setting, those in the Symmetric 
game are significantly more likely to cooperate than those movers in either the Asymmetric 1 
game (p = 0.083) or the Asymmetric 2 game (p = 0.06). However, there are no significant 
differences in the rate of cooperation by second movers among any of the three games.  
A choice to play appears to reflect players’ beliefs about whether or not their matched 
counterparts will cooperate. That is, in the sequential setting, the order of the rates of choosing to 
play among first movers corresponds to the order of the rates of cooperation among second 
movers responding to first mover’s cooperation: Asymmetric 2 > Symmetric > Asymmetric 1. 
Further, in the simultaneous games, the rates at which players choose to play the game 
corresponds to the rates of cooperation among those who choose to play the game; more subjects 
choose to play in the Symmetric game than in the Asymmetric games, and more subjects who 
choose to play cooperate in the Symmetric game than those in the Asymmetric game. Thus, 
players seem to form relatively accurate predictions about the expected behavior of other players’ 
behavior conditional on others’ choosing to play the game and then respond to this expectation 
when they decide whether to play the game or not. This again suggests that players evaluate other 
player’s motivations and not solely their own. 
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4. Discussion 
All of the games studied here have a payoff structure in which mutual defection is the 
only equilibrium if players make decisions based only on their own monetary returns. Yet most 
researchers, working with a wide range of settings, find that a significant proportion of subjects 
cooperate in PD games and other similar social dilemma games (see Ahn, Ostrom, Walker, 2003 
and the citations therein). Typically, however, these experiments utilize a symmetric payoff 
structure. This study broadens the scope of these previous studies. Our results suggest that 
asymmetry in payoffs, sequential play, and having an exit option interact in their impact on 
behavior. Below we discuss how these factors interact with subjects’ strategic choices.   
Three principal findings emerge from this research. First, asymmetry has a clear negative 
effect on cooperation in simultaneous decision settings. This finding is true for games with and 
without an exit option. We hypothesize that asymmetric payoffs may increase uncertainty about 
the intentions of one’s partner, leading to reduced cooperation. Previous research indicates that 
focal points may organize cooperative behavior with the most important focal point being 
equality of payoffs. In the asymmetric games examined here, there is no obvious focal point for 
cooperation, and in fact, the only outcome in which partners receive equal payoffs is joint 
defection. Further, the asymmetric game yields unequal payoff incentives in regard to gains from 
cooperation, the cost of cooperating when one’s partner defects, and the temptation to defect. It is 
likely that players observe that a disadvantaged player has a larger monetary incentive to defect 
and a greater loss from cooperating if her/his partner defects. Thus subjects, who might otherwise 
prefer an outcome of mutual cooperation, may be reluctant to cooperate in anticipation of 
defection by their counterpart. Finally, both aspects of the decision situation, the lack of a focal 
point and the differing pecuniary incentives to cooperate, may lead subjects to perceive the 
outcome of cooperation as “unfair”.  
Second, asymmetry interacts with order of play in sequential settings. In games with and 
without an exit option, first movers in the Asymmetric 1 sequential game (the advantaged 
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players) are significantly less likely to cooperate than participants in the 
Asymmetric/simultaneous setting. In contrast, second movers in the Asymmetric 2 sequential 
game (the advantaged players) are more likely to cooperate (conditional on cooperation by the 
first mover) than are participants in the Asymmetric/simultaneous setting. These results are 
consistent with the theoretical prediction proposed above. If subjects are concerned about 
fairness, in the sense of equality of payoffs, and have a preference for mutual cooperation, the 
differences in incentives of advantaged and disadvantaged players will interact with order of play. 
Survey results suggest that there exists a class of subjects who are willing to cooperate if they 
have a reasonable assurance that their counterpart will cooperate (Ahn, Ostrom, and Walker, 
2004). In the Asymmetric 1 sequential game, the disadvantaged player has the strategic 
advantage, in the sense of moving second, and also has a large incentive to defect ($8). Player 1, 
the advantaged player, may anticipate this and not cooperate as a first mover. In contrast, in the 
Asymmetric 2 sequential game, the advantaged player has the strategic advantage of moving 
second, but has a smaller incentive to defect ($4). Here player 1, the disadvantaged player, may 
be less fearful of defection by player 2 and thus choose to cooperate. Thus, when the advantaged 
player moves second, we would expect more cooperation by first movers and by second movers 
responding to their cooperation.  
Finally, the presence of an exit option increases the overall rate of cooperation by players 
who choose to play. In addition, the likelihood of players choosing to play the game is tied to 
their relatively accurate predictions regarding how the game would be played if they chose to 
play. Thus, the relative rates of cooperation in games without an exit option predict the likelihood 
of players choosing to play the game when there is an exit option.  
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Figure 1.  Experimental Payoff Matrices 
 
Design:   Symmetric 
Game Parameters:  E=18, B=$18, C=$24  
Exit Option:   $24 
 
IF PARTICIPANT 2 CHOOSES  
A B 
A Participant 1 gets $30 Participant 2 gets $30 
Participant 1 gets $12 
Participant 2 gets $36 IF 
PARTICIPANT 1 
CHOOSES B Participant 1 gets $36 Participant 2 gets $12 
Participant 1 gets $18 
Participant 2 gets $18 
 
 
 
Design:   Asymmetric 1 
Game Parameters: E1 = 18, B1= $20, C = $24, E2 = 18, B2 = $16, C = $24   
Exit Option:   Participant 1 = $26, Participant 2 = $22 
 
IF PARTICIPANT 2 CHOOSES  
A B 
A Participant 1 gets $34 Participant 2 gets $26 
Participant 1 gets $14 
Participant 2 gets $34 IF 
PARTICIPANT 1 
CHOOSES B Participant 1 gets $38 Participant 2 gets $10 
Participant 1 gets $18 
Participant 2 gets $18 
 
 
Design:   Asymmetric 2 
Game Parameters: E1 = 18, B1 = $16, C = $24, E2 = 18, B2 = $20, C = $24   
Exit Option:   Participant 1 = $22, Participant 2 = $26 
 
IF PARTICIPANT 2 CHOOSES  
A B 
A Participant 1 gets $26 Participant 2 gets $34 
Participant 1 gets $10 
Participant 2 gets $38 IF 
PARTICIPANT 1 
CHOOSES B Participant 1 gets $34 Participant 2 gets $14 
Participant 1 gets $18 
Participant 2 gets $18 
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Figure 2. Prisoner’s Dilemma with Two preference types 
Player 2  
Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate R1 , R2 S1 , T2-- g2 
Player 1 
Defect T1-- g1, S2 P1 , P2 
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Table 1.  Frequency of Cooperation and Test Statistics: No Exit Option. Entries in the upper 
table are the percentage of cooperation with absolute number of cooperative choices or number of 
observations in parentheses. In the lower table, p-values are from two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum 
tests. 
 
SIMULTANEOUS GAME Symmetric Asymmetric 1 & 2 Pooled 
 
 
32% 
(26/80) 
 
13% 
(12/90) 
 
SEQUENTIAL GAME 
 
Symmetric 
 
Asymmetric 1 
 
Asymmetric 2 
 
SEQUENTIAL PLAYER 1 
30% 
(12/40) 
0% 
(0/24) 
14% 
(3/21) 
 
SEQUENTIAL PLAYER 2: CONDITIONAL  
ON PLAYER 1 COOPERATING 
35% 
(14/40) 
21% 
(5/24) 
43% 
(9/21) 
 
SEQUENTIAL PLAYER 2: CONDITIONAL  
ON PLAYER 1 DEFECTING 
5% 
(2/40) 
4% 
(1/24) 
9.5% 
(2/21) 
 
SIMULTANEOUS GAME Symmetric vs. Asymmetric:  p=0.003 
 
SEQUENTIAL GAME 
 
 
Symmetric vs. 
Asymmetric 1 
 
 
Symmetric vs. 
Asymmetric 2 
 
 
Asymmetric 1 vs. 
Asymmetric 2 
 
 
SEQUENTIAL PLAYER 1 
 
p=0.003 
 
p=0.179 
 
p=0.058 
 
SEQUENTIAL PLAYER 2: CONDITIONAL  
  ON PLAYER 1 COOPERATING 
 
p=0.234 p=0.551 p=0.115 
PLAYER 2: COOPERATION 
CONDITIONAL  
  ON PLAYER 1 DEFECTING 
p=0.880 p=0.501 p=0.477 
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Table 2.  Frequency of Play, Frequency of Cooperation, and Test Statistics: Exit Option. 
Entries in the upper table are the percentage of cooperation with absolute number of cooperative 
choices or number of observations in parentheses. In the lower table, p-values are from two-
sample Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric 
 
Asymmetric 1 & 2 Pooled 
SIMULTANEOUS GAME 
 
41% 
(33/80) 
 
29% 
(26/ 90) 
 
 
SEQUENTIAL GAME 
 
 
Symmetric 
 
 
Asymmetric 1 
 
 
Asymmetric 2 
SEQUENTIAL GAME PLAYER 1 
 
18% 
(7/40) 
 
4% 
(1/24) 
38% 
(8/21) 
 
SEQUENTIAL GAME PLAYER 2 
 
52% 
(21/40) 
 
71% 
(17/ 24) 
62% 
(13/21) 
 
 
 
Symmetric 
 
Asymmetric 1 & 2 Pooled 
SIMULTANEOUS GAME 
 
45% 
(15/33) 
 
12% 
(3/26) 
 
 
SEQUENTIAL GAME 
 
 
Symmetric 
 
 
Asymmetric 1 
 
 
Asymmetric 2 
SEQUENTIAL PLAYER 1 
 
86% 
(6/7) 
 
0% 
(0/1) 
38% 
(3/8) 
 
SEQUENTIAL PLAYER 2: CONDITIONAL 
ON PLAYER 1 COOPERATING 
43% 
(9/21) 
18 % 
(3/17) 
62% 
(8/13) 
 
SEQUENTIAL PLAYER 2: CONDITIONAL 
ON PLAYER 1 DEFECTING 
0% 
(0/21) 
6% 
(1/17) 
8% 
(1/13) 
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Appendix1: Game Instructions and a Sample Decision Sheet Used in the U.S.  
Initial Instructions 
 
In this experiment, you will make choices in four different decision situations.  After the 
experiment is over, we will randomly pick one of the four decision situations for computing 
earnings. 
 
You have been randomly matched with one other participant.  Further, you will be randomly 
selected to be Participant 1 or Participant 2. Your earnings will depend upon your decisions and 
the decisions of the participant with whom you are matched.   
 
All decisions will be anonymous.  You will never know the identity of the other participant with 
whom you are matched. Do not talk with other participants and do not look on others’ decision 
sheets. Below we describe the ten steps for the experiment. 
1. You will receive instructions for the first decision situation that will explain the type of 
decision you will make.  Then, you will be given time to make your decision in that situation. 
2. We will then proceed to the instructions for the second decision situation, and you will again 
be given time to make your decision for that situation.   
3. We will then proceed to the instructions for the third decision situation, and you will again be 
given time to make your decision for that situation.   
4. Finally, we will proceed to the fourth decision situation, where you will be given instructions 
and time to make your decision for that situation.   
5. Before we collect your decisions, you will be given time to go back and change any of your 
decisions in the four decision situations.   
6. After all participants have had time to finalize their decisions, we will collect the decisions. 
7. We will randomly pick one of the four decision situations for computing earnings.   
8. Your earnings will depend on your decisions and the decisions of the participant with whom 
you are matched.  
9. While we are calculating your earnings, you will be asked to complete a short, one page 
questionnaire. 
10. At the end of the experiment, you will receive your $5 show-up fee, plus your earnings from 
the decision situation that was selected.  
 
 
You are participant _____ in pair ____ for all four decision situations. Your subject number is: 
______  
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Instructions for Second Decision Situation 
  
The instructions below describe the second decision situation you face and the way earnings will 
be determined if this decision situation is the one that is randomly selected. 
 
 
You are “Participant 1” and the other decision maker is “Participant 2”. 
 
Each Participant will choose between option “A” and option “B”. 
 
The information below describes the earnings you and the other participant will receive, 
depending upon which option you each choose. 
 
 
IF PARTICIPANT 2 CHOOSES  
A B 
A Participant 1 gets $30 
Participant 2 gets $30 
Participant 1 gets $12 
Participant 2 gets $36 IF PARTICIPANT 
1 CHOOSES B Participant 1 gets $36 
Participant 2 gets $12 
Participant 1 gets $18 
Participant 2 gets $18 
 
 
In this decision situation, Participant 1 must make one decision and Participant 2 must make two 
decisions that depend upon the choices that could be made by Participant 1. Payoffs will be based 
only on the relevant one of Participant 2’s decisions. In other words, if Participant 1 chooses 
option “A” then only the first decision made by Participant 2 will be counted. If Participant 1 
chooses option “B” then only the second decision made by Participant 2 will be counted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The box below shows the decision options for Participant 1 and Participant 2. 
 
Please mark your decision in the un-shaded box below. 
 
Participant 1 Participant 2  
I choose:  A _______       B 
_______     
 
If Participant 1 chooses A, I choose:  A _______      B 
_______ 
If Participant 1 chooses B, I choose:  A _______      B 
_______  
 
 
You are participant 1 in pair ____ for all four decision situations. Your subject number is: ______   
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1  The experiments were conducted in Korea and in the U.S. The payoffs for Korea were identical 
except for using an exchange rate of $1 = W1,111. 
2 T stands for temptation to defect and is the payoff to an individual defecting on a cooperator. R 
is the reward gained by one of a pair of cooperators. P is for punishment, the payment received by 
one of a pair of defectors. S is the sucker’s payoff received by a cooperator paired with a defector. 
3 The linear altruism models are one exception (Cain, 1998), however, these are among the 
weakest of the preference models (see Ahn, Ostrom, and Walker, 2003). 
4  IU Students in introductory economics classes have majors in a wide variety of areas, including 
economics, business, political sciences, journalism, etc. A large percentage is pre-business. 
SKKU students in introductory social science classes also have majors in a wide variety of areas, 
such as political sciences, public administration, journalism, social work, economics, etc. The 
main reason for conducting the experiment in two countries was to widen the subject pool. 
Brandts et al. (2002) show that cultural difference is small across four countries in a public goods 
provision game. Also Cho and Choi (2000) show the rates of cooperation in symmetric PD are 
strikingly similar between Korea and the U.S. Some studies do identify significant behavioral 
difference across different societies (Henrich et al. 2001). But the 15 small scale communities 
studies by Henrich et al. differ from one another in their primary modes of production, while the 
countries compared in Brandt et al. and this paper can be all characterized as market economies.  
5 Appendix 1 contains a copy of the game instructions and a sample decision sheet used in the 
US. Note that this is one of 48 different decisions sheets corresponding to the four different 
decisions situations, the three game designs, the two player positions (first mover or second 
mover) and the two nations. The one included here is the decision sheet for a US first mover in 
the sequential setting with no exit option and with symmetric payoffs.  
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6  In this paper we pool the observations from the two countries and do not report the subjects’ 
answers to the questionnaire. Lee, Ostrom, and Walker (2004) report results from a part of this 
data set, comparing the results from the U.S. and Korea, in games without an exit option.  
